Zero-confirmation transactions, i.e. transactions that have been broadcast but are still pending to be included in the blockchain, have gained attention in order to enable fast payments in Bitcoin, shortening the time for performing payments. Fast payments are desirable in certain scenarios, for instance, when buying in vending machines, fast food restaurants, or withdrawing from an ATM. Despite being quickly propagated through the network, zero-confirmation transactions are not protected against double-spending attacks, since the double-spending protection Bitcoin offers relies on the blockchain and, by definition, such transactions are not yet included in it. In this paper, we propose a double-spending prevention mechanism for Bitcoin zero-confirmation transactions. Our proposal is based on exploiting the flexibility of the Bitcoin scripting language together with a well-known vulnerability of the ECDSA signature scheme to discourage attackers from performing such an attack.
Introduction
Double spending, or spending a currency token more than once, is the main security issue that digital currencies have to deal with. Unlike physical money, where the physical token is hard to copy, and once it has been spent it passes effectively to the recipients' hands, digital currency tokens can be easily copied and double spent if security mechanisms are not correctly applied.
Bitcoin deals with this double-spending problem by building an append-only ledger, the blockchain, that is replicated in every single Bitcoin full node. The blockchain is made of blocks that are stacked on top of each other. Blocks are made of entries, which contain some source (inputs) and destination (outputs). Entries in the blockchain are called transactions, and they are used to transfer Bitcoins between different users, typically identified by their Bitcoin addresses. Bitcoin transfer is performed by using an unspent output of a previous transaction (UTXO) as the input of a new one. Therefore, Bitcoin transactions consume previous outputs and generate new ones.
Transactions are broadcast over the Bitcoin P2P network aiming to reach every single node. Nodes will validate the correctness of the received transactions and include the correct ones in their mempool. Such validation includes, among others checks, that the transaction does not claim any spent funds. Finally, every valid transaction should be eventually included in a new block. Hence, double spending is prevented once a transaction is part of the blockchain, since it has been 
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proven that no previous transaction spends from the same outputs, and future transactions will be prevented to do so. 1 However, transactions are not automatically included in blocks. In the time between transaction broadcasting and its inclusion, transactions are known as zero-confirmation transactions, and they are just stored in the mempool of the nodes that have received them. Therefore, during this time window, different transactions spending the same outputs can be spread through the Bitcoin P2P network.
Having received a transaction spending an unspent output, the default behaviour of a node will be to store the transaction in his local mempool and drop any other incoming transactions trying to spend from the same source. However, different nodes could receive different transactions spending from the same source, and double spending could be attempted. For instance, suppose that two transactions (t x 1 and t x 2 ) that spend the same output from a previous transaction (t x 0 ) are created by an attacker A. t x 1 is used to pay for some goods to B, while t x 2 is used to return the funds to the attacker. In this scenario, if A can make B believe that t x 1 is the only transaction spending from t x 0 's output, but t x 2 finally becomes included in a block, the attack is successful. Figure 1 depicts the aforementioned example.
Notice that only one of the double-spending transactions will be included in a block due to the double-spending protection that Bitcoin achieves by design. However, in case t x 2 is included in a block, t x 1 will be discarded and the doublespending attack will succeed.
In this paper, we propose a solution to mitigate the doublespending problem for Bitcoin zero-confirmation transactions. In our proposal, any single observer who identifies a double-spending attempt may take part and punish the attacker. Moreover, our solution discourages the attacker even to attempt the double-spending, because doing so makes him risk losing an amount of Bitcoins bigger than the doublespent amount. Our solution benefits fast-payment scenarios, like in-shop purchases or trading platforms, where the transfer Bitcoin-product/service cannot wait until the transaction is confirmed in the blockchain. Finally, although this paper is focused in Bitcoin transactions for conciseness, a similar construction can be developed for other cryptocurrencies with zero-confirmation transactions and based on ECDSA signatures, for instance, Litecoin or Dogecoin.
The paper is structured as follows: First, Sect. 2 reviews the state of the art in double-spending protection for fastpayment transactions within Bitcoin. Then, Sect. 3 introduces the most important concepts about Bitcoin transactions, needed to understand our contribution. Next, Sect. 4 explains our proposed mechanism for discouraging double-spending attempts. Section 5 provides implementation details and Bitcoin scripts to deploy the proposed scheme. After that, Sect. 6 analyses the benefits each party obtains when applying the proposed protocol. Finally, Sect. 7 presents the conclusions and provides guidelines for further research.
State of the art
Double-spending attacks on zero-confirmation transactions in Bitcoin were first analysed by Karame et al. [1, 2] . The authors showed how, with some reasonable assumptions and without the need of special computation nor much network overhead, an attacker has a great probability of succeeding with a double-spending attack. Moreover, the authors also showed how basic countermeasures such as waiting a few seconds before accepting the payment or adding observers that report back to the payee are not enough on their own to avoid these types of attacks. Additionally, the authors proposed to modify the Bitcoin protocol rules so that nodes forward double-spending transactions instead of dropping them. By doing so, all nodes may be notified of double-spending attempts. However, such a mechanism eases denial-of-service attacks. Moreover, nodes receiving both transactions will not be able to distinguish between the original and the double-spending one.
The approach of monitoring observers has been implemented by companies such as GAP600 [3] in order to provide risk evaluation for accepting zero-confirmation transactions. Nevertheless, the company does not provide details regarding the technique used to perform the analysis nor the evaluation.
Regarding mitigation of double-spending attacks, Bamert et al. [4] proposed some other countermeasures that can reduce the merchant's likelihood of being deceived by an attacker: requiring the merchant to be connected to a large random sample of nodes of the network and not accepting incoming connections. By applying such countermeasures, the merchant ensures that the attacker cannot send the transaction directly to him nor should be able to identify his neighbours.
Other research studies have proven that this kind of attacks was actually possible, and not only was the attacker able to identify the merchant's neighbours, but also to make the merchant connect only to nodes controlled by the attacker [5] [6] [7] .
Ultimately, none of the proposed countermeasures forces attackers to stop trying, nor punishes them by not doing so. However, if some penalty could be applied to anyone who tries to perform such an attack, and this penalty could be implemented by any node which detects it (instead of just dropping the transactions), attackers may be discouraged even to try it.
The idea of using penalties to discourage misbehaviour in protocols on top of cryptocurrencies is not new [8] . However, recent proposals, such as the lightning network [9] , have popularized this approach, that is now used in many other systems (e.g. mental poker playing [10, 11] or proofof-space schemes [12] ). In such a way, and alternatively to other works [4] , we address the double-spending problem in fast payments by introducing a penalty for the attacker.
This penalty involves the disclosure of a private key. A similar penalty mechanism has also been proposed in [13] as a generic penalty for parties issuing contradictory statements. Our proposal presents a simpler solution, which does not require the use of additional protocols other than Bitcoin.
Background on Bitcoin transactions
As we have already stated, Bitcoin transactions are the tool for value transfer in the Bitcoin protocol. Bitcoin transfer is performed by using an unspent output of a previous transaction (UTXO) as the input of a new one. Therefore, Bitcoin transactions consume previous outputs and generate new ones.
The input of a Bitcoin transaction is formed, mainly, by three fields. The two first ones, namely previous transaction id and previous output index, uniquely identify the UTXO that is being claimed by the input. The third field, identified as scriptSig, provides the conditions to be met by the transaction to be valid and the payment be correctly performed. Such conditions were defined in the transaction output that is going to be spent. Both conditions, the specification in the output and the fulfilment in the input, are codified using the Bitcoin scripting language [14] , a stack-based language defined in the Bitcoin protocol.
The output of a Bitcoin transaction includes two fields. The first one represents the value (in satoshis) that the output is holding. 2 The second field, named scriptPubKey, defines the conditions to be fulfilled to spend output.
Even though transactions within Bitcoin are, in most cases, bound to Bitcoin addresses (locking conditions) and redeemed providing digital signatures (unlocking conditions), the Bitcoin scripting language is flexible enough to allow the definition of many other scripts that encode different conditions under which the outputs may be spent, as we describe in the next section.
The Bitcoin scripting language
In order to spend a UTXO, the locking conditions specified by the script in its scriptPubkey field have to be met. The fulfilment of these conditions is provided by the values included in the scriptSig field of the input that spends the UTXO. To evaluate whether an input can spend a corresponding output, the code included in the scriptPubKey is appended to the values included in the scriptSig, and the complete set of instructions is executed. Only if the execution evaluates to true, the input is able to spend the UTXO. Notice that this general approach allows not only to spend UTXO based on digital signatures but also to create much richer constructions, the so-called smart contracts.
Smart contracts can indeed specify complex conditions. 3 For instance, besides the popular Pay-to-Public-Key-Hash (P2PKH) and the Pay-to-Public-Key (P2PK) outputs where a standard digital signature must be provided to spend the UTXO, there exist multi-signature constructions, where a UTXO is locked under n public keys, and at least m matching signatures must be provided. Furthermore, even more, general constructions can be deployed using Pay-to-ScriptHash (P2SH) outputs. P2SH outputs encode an ad hoc set of instructions in the form of a script. The hash of such script is set as locking conditions in the scriptPubKey field of an output. An input spending such an output must contain the corresponding script, along with any necessary data to make the whole script evaluate to true.
Digital signatures on Bitcoin
Digital signatures in Bitcoin are performed with the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). ECDSA has a set of system parameters: an elliptic curve field and equation C, a generator G of the elliptic curve C, and a prime q which corresponds to the order of G. The values for these parameters are defined to be secp256k1 [15] for Bitcoin.
Let * be the operation of multiplying an elliptic curve point by a scalar. Given a specific configuration of the parameters and a private key d, the ECDSA signature algorithm over the message m is defined as follows:
If either s or r is 0, go back to step 1.
Output: sig(m) = (r , s)
The ECDSA signature scheme is therefore probabilistic, that is, there exist many different valid signatures made with the same private key for the same message. The selection of a specific signature from the set of valid ones is determined by the election of the integer k.
There exists a well-known ECDSA signature vulnerability (also present in the non-elliptic curve signature scheme of ElGamal and its popular variant, DSA [16, 17] ) by which an attacker that observes two signatures of different messages made with the same private key is able to extract the private key if the signer reuses the same k selected on step 1. Therefore, the selection of k is critical to the security of the system. Indeed, given two ECDSA signatures that have been created using the same k and the same private key, sig 1 = sig(m 1 ) = (r , s 1 ) and sig 2 = sig(m 2 ) = (r , s 2 ) with m 1 = m 2 , an attacker that obtains m 1 , sig 1 and m 2 , sig 2 may derive the private key d:
Recall that, by definition of the signature scheme:
Note that, since r is deterministically created from k and the fixed parameters of the scheme, the r values of both signatures will be the same. 
Moreover, the leakage of private key information is not only restricted to the case where the exact same k values are used, but also to situations when similar k values are generated [18, 19] .
Some Bitcoin wallets adopted deterministic ECDSA after this vulnerability was found to affect some Bitcoin transactions [20] [21] [22] . In deterministic ECDSA [23] , the determinism in the algorithm comes precisely from the selection of k, which is derived from the message to sign and the private key using an HMAC construction. In this way, for a fixed message and private key, the value k is always the same. The HMAC construction ensures that the mapping between the message and k appears random from the point of view of an observer that does not know the private key. Key generation and signature validation algorithms remain the same as in the non-deterministic version of ECDSA. As we will see, our proposal can be used both with deterministic and with non-deterministic ECDSA.
Taking advantage of this vulnerability to perform a private key, disclosure in Bitcoin has been previously used for timestamping in data commitment schemes by Clark and Essex [24] .
Bitcoin transactions propagation
As we already pointed out, Bitcoin transactions are propagated through a peer-to-peer network. Every node of the network broadcasts the transactions he generates and propagates transactions received from other network peers. As a protection against denial-of-service attacks, every peer performs different validations on every received transaction before its propagation, 4 like data format validation, digital signature verification, or correctness checks over the values involved in the transaction. Besides such validations, the node also validates that the received transaction does not spend an already spent output, either by a transaction already in the blockchain or by a transaction included in the node's mempool. In case that some validation fails, the node drops the transaction, and therefore, the transaction is not propagated any further.
However, since Bitcoin Core 0.12, Bitcoin includes a replace-by-fee mechanism (RBF) that allows transactions to signal replaceability. This mechanism was introduced to allow to increase the fee of an already broadcast transaction to boost its odds of inclusion in the blockchain. Therefore, if a transaction is flagged as replaceable with RBF, it can be replaced from the node's mempool by a newer transaction that spends the same outputs but includes a higher fee. 5 Moreover, this new transaction will also be further propagated throughout the network, since it is considered a valid transaction that replaces the previous one. This feature ensures that when a transaction is flagged as a RBF, a double-spending transaction of the same UTXO will be propagated further than a double spending of a regular (non-RBF) transaction.
Double-spending prevention mechanism
Our proposed scheme discourages signers from performing double-spending attacks in zero-confirmation transactions used in fast-payment scenarios. Fast-payment scenarios are those where the merchant delivers the goods or services when seeing the payment transaction in the Bitcoin network, without waiting for the transaction to be confirmed. Examples of such scenarios are on-site shopping where the buyer cannot wait 10 min to leave the shop after purchase or in trading platforms where a timely transaction can save/earn you money.
In our scenario, we assume that the adversary is the buyer that pays for some goods to a merchant, and that may have incentives to try to double spend the payment in order to finish the interaction with both the goods and the payment amount.
We assume that he can perform a double-spending attack by generating multiple transactions that spend from the same output and broadcast them selectively in the Bitcoin P2P network. Additionally, we also assume that all peers of the network have the same capabilities, that is, they can generate and broadcast double-spend transactions (if they know the private key needed to generate a signature).
In order to discourage double-spending attacks, we propose a mechanism to construct special transaction outputs. Such outputs can be spent with a single signature but have the property that if two different signatures for the same output are disclosed (for instance, in two different transactions spending the same output as a double-spending attack), the private key used to sign the transaction is revealed. This mechanism allows any observer to generate a third transaction spending the same output and sending the amount to an address controlled by himself.
To allow such a construction, we propose a new Bitcoin script that we call fixed-r pay-to-pubkey script (FR-P2PK). This script is a variant of the standard pay-to-pubkey (P2PK) script where a signature is required to redeem, but a FR-P2PK script adds an additional condition to be able to spend the output: the signature must be made with a specific r value. Then, due to the ECDSA vulnerability described in Sect. 3.2, this particular condition discourages doublespending of that output. Indeed, if the sender generates another transaction that spends the same output and propagates it through the P2P network, the sender risks losing all the funds deposited in the address, because any peer that captures both transactions will be able to derive the private key. Recall that the value r is computed from the value k as described in Sect. 3.2, giving a one-to-one correspondence between them.
Basic prevention mechanism
Let Alice be a user that wants to take advantage of the proposed double-spending prevention mechanism, and let {PK a , SK a } be an ECDSA key pair belonging to Alice.
The double-spending prevention mechanism is made of two phases: initialization, that is performed before the payment is made, and fast payment, where the payment is executed.
Initialization
The initialization phase is performed beforehand. During this phase, Alice generates a funding transaction that transfers some funds from an output in her control to a FR-P2PK output also under her control. In order to do so, Alice chooses a random integer k and a public key PK a (for which she knows the associated secret key SK a ), constructs the FR-P2PK output, and sends some funds to an output in her control (see Fig. 2 ).
Alice broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for the transaction to be confirmed, upon which the initialization phase is considered terminated.
A single funding transaction may include multiple FR-P2PK outputs (with different public keys) in order to allow Alice to use the proposed prevention mechanism multiple times. Therefore, there is no need to perform the initialization phase before every fast payment, as long as Alice has enough funds stored in FR-P2PK outputs. Alice may repeat the initialization phase if she runs out of unspent FR-P2PK outputs. Additionally, notice that Alice remains in control of all the funds deposited by the funding transaction, and she is able to transfer them back to a standard output whenever she wants. At some point in future, Alice wants to send some amount of Bitcoins to another user Bob. Alice does not want to wait for the confirmation of the transaction and Bob is not willing to accept the transaction without confirmation. So they decide to use the proposed double-spending prevention mechanism, executing the fast-payment phase.
Fast payment
Alice creates a fast-payment transaction that pays to Bob spending from the FR-P2PK output of the funding transaction. The input script in the fast-payment transaction forces Alice (the redeemer) not only to prove she has the private key SK a associated with the given public key PK a by creating a valid signature, but also to deliver a signature that has been made using the specific k value that Alice chose during the initialization phase (see Fig. 3 ). Alice broadcasts the fast-payment transaction to the Bitcoin P2P network.
Then, when Bob sees the fast-payment transaction in his mempool, he can validate that the output script of the funding transaction spent by the fast-payment transaction is indeed a FR-P2PK script. If the validation is correct, Bob knows that if Alice tries to double-spend the transaction she takes the risk of losing the Bitcoins of that output.
If Alice decides to try to double spend the fast-payment transaction (see Fig. 4 , double-spending attempt), she needs to create a double-spending transaction that also spends the FR-P2PK output of the funding transaction. This doublespending transaction has to be valid, so it needs to include a (second) signature made with SK a and the k value chosen on the initialization phase. Hence, the moment the double-spend transaction is created, there exist two different signatures made with the same private key SK a using the same r . The signatures will be indeed different since the signed content (i.e. the transactions) will also be different. Recall that, because of the ECDSA vulnerability mentioned above, knowing two different signatures made by the same private key with the same k value is enough to derive the private key used to sign.
As a consequence, if Alice broadcasts the double-spend transaction, she risks losing her funds. This happens because any observer that receives both transactions (the fast-payment transaction and the double-spending transaction) will be able to derive Alice's secret key SK a and, as a consequence, create a third transaction, the penalty transaction that also spends the FR-P2PK output of the funding transaction but that sends the Bitcoins to the observer. Note that this strategy may be performed simultaneously by any observer, ending with multiple penalty transactions, as it is depicted in Fig. 4. 
Disincentive-based prevention mechanism
The basic prevention method described in the previous section has a clear drawback. Suppose that Alice performs a purchase to Bob's shop and Bob accepts a fast transaction from Alice. When such transaction is received, Bob delivers the goods to Alice. However, once Alice has the goods, she may try to perform a double-spending attack. In case an observer sees both the fast-payment transaction and the double-spending transaction, he constructs the penalty transaction and manages to get it accepted in the blockchain, Alice loses her funds but Bob does not receive the payment. In that case, Bob may have complied with his part of the agreement (e.g. delivered the bought goods) but will not receive the agreed amount of Bitcoins in exchange. Alice would have paid the agreed amount of Bitcoins to a third party (the observer) instead of paying them to Bob, but she would remain in possession of the goods. The observer would obtain the total amount of the transaction. As a consequence, Alice will not lose anything by trying the double spend (just the amount she is already willing to pay for it), and thus, the proposed method may not be discouraging enough to prevent double-spending attempts.
However, a minor modification to the method may be enough to discourage Alice from attempting any double spend: enforcing that the amount deposited to the FR-P2PK output of the funding transaction is higher than the paid amount by a certain factor λ. Recall that a Bitcoin UTXO must be spent in its totality (i.e. it is not possible to spend a part of a UTXO). Therefore, if the FR-P2PK output has an To: Alice amount bigger than what Alice must pay to Bob, Alice proceeds to create the fast-payment transaction including two different outputs: one that pays to Bob the agreed amount, and the other that pays back to her the change. This has no consequences on the normal operation of the protocol, that is, if Alice well-behaves, Bob ends up with his payment and Alice gets her change back. However, because the whole FR-P2PK output is spent, if Alice tries to double spend the fast payment she risks losing the entire amount of the FR-P2PK output, and not only the amount paid to Bob. As we will discuss in Sect. 6, by adjusting the λ factor Alice's penalty for double-spending can also be adjusted (and thus Bob's confidence on the fast payment).
Moreover, note that the fast-payment transaction may also have multiple inputs spending different FR-P2PK outputs which in turn allows Alice to perform payments of different amounts and with varying levels of penalty without having to freeze a high quantity of Bitcoins into FR-P2PK outputs.
Notice that Bob does not get refunded in case of fraud. The objective of this work is to counteract potential frauds by penalizing Alice. An alternative approach to refund Bob could be designed but remains out of the scope of the current proposal.
The role of the observers
The funding transaction is confirmed before starting the fastpayment phase, so any full node of the network is aware of its existence. Moreover, because it has an output with an easily identifiable script, the FR-P2PK script, any observer aware of the specification of our proposed mechanism is able to identify the transaction as a funding transaction belonging to our protocol. Therefore, such an observer will be able to monitor his mempool, looking for transactions that spend the FR-P2PK output. Once a transaction spending from the FR-P2PK output is seen, the observer is able to actively listen to the network, searching for any other transaction spending the same output. If the observer is able to catch a doublespending transaction, he should be able to construct a penalty transaction, moving the funds to an address controlled by himself. If the observer does not capture a double-spending transaction, he may stop this active listening period and return to its normal behaviour when a transaction spending the FR-P2PK output is included in the blockchain.
To achieve the maximum level of propagation and thus to spread awareness of the double-spending attempt, fastpayment transactions are flagged with replace-by-fee (RFB). By forcing a customer to flag a transaction in such a way a merchant enables the forwarding of future double-spending transactions, that could be detected by a higher number of nodes, increasing the odds of an observer receiving two instances of the transaction and, therefore, publishing a punishment transaction. Note that even though transactions are flagged with RBF, some actors may not have incentives to propagate duplicate transactions. This is the case, for instance, of miners that are aware of the protocol, that may prefer to mine their own penalty transaction instead of propagating a third-party penalty transaction (after having sent any of the other transactions). However, many other actors would indeed propagate penalty transactions, for instance non-miner observers, that need to send their penalty transaction to a miner for inclusion in a block; nodes not participating in the protocol (e.g. nodes running the standard Bitcoin client), that propagate RBF transactions by default; or nodes just aware of one of the transactions, that would not even be aware of which of the transactions it is.
Implementation details
In this section, we describe how to construct the FR-P2PK output of the funding transaction as well as the inputs of the transactions that spend it, taking into account Bitcoin's signature format and scripting language.
First of all, notice that it would be possible to encapsulate the proposed FR-P2PK script into a standard P2SH output. However, doing so makes the funding transaction no longer recognizable as belonging to our protocol by external observers. Therefore, an observer that is aware of the existence of our protocol would be able to detect that the mechanism is being used only after one of the transactions spending the encapsulated FR-P2PK is seen in the network. This transaction will include the FR-P2PK script in the scriptSig (input script). The moment the observer processes this script, he can start the active listening period in which he looks for other transactions spending from the same funding transaction output. Because timing is critical in our scenario, we argue that using directly a FR-P2PK output in the funding transaction is the best alternative.
In a Bitcoin transaction, signatures are represented by a single hexadecimal value, which corresponds to the DER encoding of the two-element sequence of the r and s integers that make up an ECDSA signature. Figure 5 describes the format of a Bitcoin signature. Each integer r and s (see Sect. 3.2 regarding the notation) is encoded with three different fields: a 1-byte field with the 0x02 flag denoting the integer type, a 1-byte field with the size l of the integer (in bytes), and an l-byte field with the integer value itself. Then, the signature includes a 1-byte field with a flag denoting a sequence (0x30), a 1-byte field with the length of the sequence, the sequence of the two integers, and finally a 1-byte field with Both r and s are 32-byte integers. However, when the first bit of any of the values is set (that is, the first byte is > 0x7f), an additional byte (0x00) is added in front of the value, thus making it 33 byte long. The reason is that DER rules interpret this first bit as a sign, and therefore, not adding 0x00 would cause the value to be interpreted as negative. Therefore, Bitcoin signatures range from 71 to 73 bytes. For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that we are dealing with 71-byte signatures, that is, signatures where both r and s are 32 byte long (Fig. 6a) .
Taking into account the format of signatures in Bitcoin, the script of a FR-P2PK output is defined as follows:
OP_DUP <pubKey> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY OP_SIZE <0x47> OP_EQUALVERIFY <sigmask> OP_AND <r> OP_EQUAL ScriptSig: <sig> where -<pubKey> is the public key that will be used to validate the signature, -<sigmask> is a 71-byte array that has ones in the positions where r and ht are specified and zeros in the rest of positions, and -<r> is the 71-byte array that represents the integer r in DER format in the positions where it is found in a signature, 0x01 in the ht field, and zeros in the rest of positions. Figure 6b , c shows the construction of <sigmask> and <r>, respectively. Regarding the construction of the byte array <r>, on the one hand the integer r is derived uniquely from the randomly chosen k value (recall Step 3 of the ECDSA signature generation algorithm in Sect. 3.2). Note that any value of k may be used by the protocol, what matters is that it is fixed beforehand (that is, before the signature is made). On the other hand, the hash flag tag ht is set to 0x01, which corresponds to SIGHASH_ALL. This flag signals that the signed content corresponds to the entire transaction (except the signature scripts themselves). By enforcing that signatures cover the entire transaction, we ensure that a double-spending attempt will include a signature different from the one found in the fast-payment transaction, and thus, In order to redeem a FR-P2PK output, the input's scriptSig only needs to include a single signature. The signature must be correct when validated with the specified public key and must be performed with a specific r value. Otherwise, the validation will fail.
Let's analyse how does the script perform these validations. First, the script duplicates the signature (with OP_DUP). This is needed in order to be able to perform different validations over the same signature value. Then, the signature is validated against the specified public key using the check signature operand (<pubKey> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY).
After that, the length of the signature is checked (OP_SIZE <0x47> OP_EQUALVERIFY). Finally, a bitwise AND operation between the signature and <sigmask> is computed (with <sigmask> OP_AND), and the result is compared with <r> (<r> OP_EQUAL). If both values are equal (that is, the signature was made using the specified r and with a hash flag of 0x01), the script terminates successfully; otherwise, the script terminates with a False value on the stack, making it fail.
Note that the only way to ensure that the script succeeds is by providing a valid signature that matches the specified <r>. Therefore, two different transactions spending the same FR-P2PK output would include two different signatures made with the same private key and the same k, and thus, by obtaining the two transactions, one is able to infer the private key that was used to create the signatures.
We have created a funding transaction in the Bitcoin testnet that exemplifies the proposed prevention mechanism. Following the transaction naming used in Figs. 2, 3, and 4 , the funding transaction 6 contains the output with a FR-P2PK script. The output of the funding transaction is currently unspendable due to the fact that it uses an OP_AND opcode that is disabled in the standard Bitcoin software.
Proposal analysis
In this section, we provide an analysis of the possible outcomes of performing a payment with the proposed mech- anism. The analysis measures the benefits of each party taking part in the system to show how it discourages doublespending attacks. Table 1 summarizes the notation used in this section. Our analysis makes the following assumptions. First of all, we assume that Alice always generates the fast-payment transaction since it is the triggering action for the payment. Once the fast payment has been generated, we assume that Bob sees the payment and, at that time and acting honestly, he delivers the goods to Alice. Furthermore, to focus the analysis in the proposed mechanism, we assume that at least one of the transactions of the system τ f , τ d , or τ p j will be confirmed. Although transactions do include fees, fees are intentionally excluded from the computation of the payoffs, since they do not directly affect the result of our evaluation. The usage of the replace-by-fee mechanism, that will allow the propagation of multiple instances of the transaction, forces double-spending transactions to include a higher fee than the original transaction. However, it could be argued that a higher fee will incentive miners to mine a double-spending transaction instead of a fast-payment transaction, affecting not only the payoff but also the odds of either succeed or fail in the attack. Nonetheless, if a miner sees two instances of the transaction (fast-payment and double-spending), he would maximize his payoff as an observer by generating a third transaction (penalty) that pays all the amount to himself (instead of choosing to include any of the previous ones depending on the fees). Moreover, notice that our analysis can be seen as an upper bound on the attacker's gains since including fees in the computation only lower the attacker's payoff, but never increase it.
Of course, due to the double-spending protection of Bitcoin for on-chain transactions, at most one of these transactions gets into the blockchain, that is, the events τ f ∈ B, τ d ∈ B, and τ p j ∈ B are mutually exclusive. Finally, notice that
since such probabilities depend on the distribution hash rate devoted to the interests of every set of users (Alice, Bob and the rest of the network, acting as observers) and we can assume that such sets will be disjunct. Taking into account these assumptions, in Fig. 7 we have represented how the possible final three states of the protocol we propose may be reached. If the fast-payment transaction τ f gets confirmed, then Bob receives the payment for the goods, Alice receives the change (the amount deposited to the funding transaction minus the payment) and the goods, and the observer does not intervene. If the double-spending transaction τ d is confirmed, then Alice gets everything (the full amount deposited in the funding transaction and the goods), and therefore, both Bob and the observers do not obtain anything. Finally, if one of the penalty transactions τ p j is confirmed, then Alice obtains the goods but loses the full deposited amount that goes to the observer. Figure 7 also describes the possible paths that end up in each of the states.
We define the payoff P of any party participating in the protocol as the gains (or losses) obtained by deviating from the correct operation of the protocol. That is, the payoff of all parties (Alice, Bob, and the observers) will be 0 when no double spending is attempted (leftmost box in Fig. 7) . 7 In that case, there will be an equilibrium, since Alice pays the specified price for some goods and obtains the goods in exchange; Bob delivers the goods and gets paid for them, and the observers do not intervene. On the contrary, if Alice 7 Here we assume that the price of the goods is equal to the value of the goods. If the price paid is higher than the cost, B's payoff is positive and reflects the benefit obtained from the sale. tries to double spend the payment, the equilibrium may be altered and the payoff will reflect the gains or losses each party assumes.
Then, Bob's payoff function P B is given by the following expression:
Note that, for fixed σ and γ , Bob's payoff only depends on Pr[τ f ∈ B]. Recall that our mechanism tries to disincentivize Alice from double-spending the payment transaction, but does not directly benefit the merchant (regardless of the λ value used by the protocol). 8 In a similar way, Alice's payoff P A is given by: Alice's maximum payoff is, therefore, γ and is obtained when Alice's successfully double spends the transaction, thus keeping the goods γ without paying anything. However, Alice's minimum payoff (that is, maximum losses) depends on λ, a parameter that can be adjusted in our protocol. Therefore, by adjusting λ, the protocol allows to tune Alice's losses, and so the risks she assumes by trying to perform a doublespending attack. The bigger the λ is, the higher the risks Alice's faces on a double-spend attempt.
Finally, an observer's j payoff is given by the expression: Figure 8 shows the evolution of the parties payoffs as a function of Pr[τ f ∈ B] and Pr[τ d ∈ B] 9 for the case where σ = γ (the value of goods is equal to the price it is paid for them), for different values of the parameter λ. The payoff dimension is measured based on the value σ . That means that a payoff of 3 implies a benefit of 3 times the value of σ , while a payoff of − 3 implies a lost of 3 times the value of σ . The payoff results are thus proportional to σ . ues λ > 1, is moving in the red zone thus being negative (Alice is losing money). The greater the λ value, the bigger the red zone.
Providing values for the exact probabilities that parameterize our analysis is far from trivial because these probabilities are affected by the personal decisions of nodes that participate in the network. These personal decisions may not even attend to economical incentives only, but also political or even non-rational ones. That being said, we can, of course, imagine a specific scenario with rational actors and estimate the probabilities for that individual case. For instance, we can assume that all miners are aware of the protocol and try to optimize their immediate profit (that is, they would try to obtain the reward of a penalty transaction if they are able to do so). Additionally, we can also assume both the fast-payment and the double-spending transactions are propagated to all miners of the network. Then, an attacker that controls the currently largest mining pool will have Pr[τ d ∈ B] = 0.24 (BTC.com has 24.6% of the hash rate as of today). 10 On the other hand, Pr[τ f ∈ B] will be 0, since no miner would mine the fast-payment transaction. (Each miner would mine their own penalty transaction.) For λ = 3, this scenario results in an attacker's payoff of P A = −1.28σ , while the sum of the observers payoffs will be ∀ j P O j = 2.28σ . The second largest pool will be the best observer, with a payoff of P O 0 = 0.51σ .
Conclusions
The speed at which payments in blockchain-based cryptocurrencies can be performed is lower bounded by the block generation interval, which in Bitcoin is fixed to 10 min. In order to provide fast payments, one of the alternatives used in these scenarios is to rely on zero-confirmation transactions, i.e. transactions that have been seen on the network but have not yet been included in the blockchain. Experimental analysis has shown that, in Bitcoin, most of the transactions propagated through the network reach 75% of the nodes in less than 8 s [25] , which is two orders of magnitude faster than the block production interval. However, zero-confirmation transactions are not secured by the standard Bitcoin double-spending protection mechanism, since this mechanism is applied to transactions included in the blockchain and zero-confirmation transactions are not yet in blocks by definition.
In this paper, we have presented a mechanism to secure fast payments within Bitcoin by reducing the risk of doublespending attacks in transactions with zero confirmations. The proposed mechanism discourages double-spending attempts by creating a special type of outputs that enforce private key disclosure in case of a double-spending attempt. Any Bitcoin network user may act as an observer and obtain a reward by detecting double-spending attempts. The reward the observer receives is equal to the price the attacker pays as punishment for having tried to double spend a transaction and may be fixed by the receiver beforehand. Nevertheless, the attacker may have enough incentive to double spend even when that will likely result in a loss for her, but pursuing Bob's lost, that could be more damaging. Such scenario may appear when the wealthy of the attacker is much higher than the receiver. However, since our proposal is an optional alternative to accept fast payments, Bob may opt out of using our system in case his possible loss would be more than he can afford.
Further research will be focused on experimentally testing the proposed approach in a Bitcoin-like P2P network, in order to quantify the probabilities of each transaction entering the blockchain depending on the exact capabilities of the attacker (both in terms of network connectivity and hash power) and the percentage of nodes of the network that are aware of the existence of the prevention mechanism. In turn, this would allow us to better evaluate the risks the merchant is facing with each transaction and to study the overhead of transactions relayed through the network by the usage of our protocol.
